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Abstract—Hue modification is the adjustment of hue property
on color images. Conducting hue modification on an image is
trivial, and it can be abused to falsify opinions of viewers. Since
shapes, edges or textural information remains unchanged after
hue modification, this type of manipulation is relatively hard to
be detected and localized. Since small patches inherit the same
Color Filter Array (CFA) configuration and demosaicing, any
distortion made by local hue modification can be detected by
patch matching within the same image. In this paper, we propose
to localize hue modification by means of a Siamese neural net-
work specifically designed for matching two inputs. By crafting
the network outputs, we are able to form a heatmap which
potentially highlights malicious regions. Our proposed method
deals well not only with uncompressed images but also with the
presence of JPEG compression, an operation usually hindering
the exploitation of CFA and demosaicing artifacts. Experimental
evidences corroborate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Index Terms—Hue modification, patch matching, Siamese
network
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern photography is losing its innocency due to the
diversed use of image manipulation software, which allows
even unexperienced users to modify digital images in different
ways. Image contents are characterized mainly by geometric
information like texture, edges and shapes, and by color infor-
mation. Color modifications, even if does not effect geometric
details, deceive human perception. They are very easy to be
performed, and hard to be detected if implemented carefully.
In this paper, we address the problem of local hue modifica-
tion, which is defined as the adjustment of angular position on
the color circle (or color wheel) within an image area. Figure
1 illustrates hue modification by different angles 1.
0◦ 60◦ 120◦ 180◦
Fig. 1. Hue modification by different angles. 0◦ means no modification.
Better viewed in color.
To cope with local image manipulations, previous works
seek for artifacts of Color Filter Array (CFA) and camera
sensor pattern noise. Vast camera sensors employ a CFA,
where each sensor element captures the light at a certain
wavelength corresponding to a color component. The re-
maining color components at blind positions are interpolated
from surrounding pixels. This interpolation is referred to as
1https://www.imagemagick.org/Usage/color mods/, last access: 15/02/2019
demosaicing. Image manipulations will likely generate some
local or global disturbances which are inconsistent to our
ordinary demosaicing artifacts [1]. More blind way to detect
local disturbances is the extraction of statistical features of rich
models capturing different types of neighboring dependencies
[2]. These features have been proved to be effective in ma-
nipulation detection and localization, see for instance [3], [4].
Besides demosaicing, the imperfections of camera sensors also
create sort of camera fingerprint, the so-called Photo-Response
Nonuniformity (PRNU) noise, which is supposed to be present
in every image [5]. In the presence of manipulation, this
pattern noise is distorted and this distortion can be exploited
as a useful clue, provided that the reference PRNU can be
reliably estimated and the forged region is sufficiently large.
The specific local image manipulation considered in this
paper, hue modification, distorts artifacts of demosaicing and
neighboring dependencies. Based on this fact, the pioneering
work in [6] analyzes demosaicing artifacts and then estimates
hue modification. Based on the observation that an interpolated
value is bigger than the minimum and smaller than the maxi-
mum of its neighborhood, on the green channel the number of
pixel values unsatisfying this condition should be the majority
of pixel which are originally captured in this channel and a
minority of interpolated pixels, resulting a big ratio between
two quantities. The estimation of hue modification is done
via searching over a set of modification angles until the
aforementioned ratio is maximized. We want to point out that
CFA analysis requires the knowledge of CFA configuration,
at least the positions of green component. Such information is
not always available, especially for online images. Moreover,
when the image undergoes JPEG compression, demosaicing
artifacts are significantly distorted. Differently, the method
proposed in [7] and [8] recovers the modification angle,
by modifying the questioned image with a set of angles
and matching its residual with the reference PRNU. In real
scenarios this technique is very difficult to be exploited since
the assumption to know the reference PRNU (or have access
to images to estimate it) is very strong and cannot be easily
satisfied.
In this work, we propose a novel method for detecting
hue modification. Our methodology exploits the fact that two
patches on the same image have the same inherent CFA
configuration and demosaicing. Hue modification on a local
region creates inconsistencies with the rest of the image, and
thus pair-wise patch matching can reveal the forged region.
To achieve such purpose, we propose a solution based on
Siamese neural networks [9], trained on positive pairs (two
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pristine patches) and negative pairs (a pristine and a modified
patch). JPEG compression before and after hue modification
is included during training, granting the network the capability
to deal with real-world conditions. Finally, we fuse multiple
outputs of patch matching to obtain a unique decision map
(heatmap), on which a postprocessing is applied to precisely
localize the forged region (Section II). Experiments demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed approach (Section III).
II. PROPOSED METHOD
Hue modification is performed in the HSV space by adding
an angle α to the value of H . Since defined on a circle, hue
modification is periodic with a period 360◦, i.e. a modification
of α is identical to α± 360◦. Besides hue, other attributes of
a color in HSV space are saturation and value (brightness),
whose changes are different from hue modification. Here, we
investigate the detection of hue modification on: i) uncom-
pressed images, ii) JPEG images where the modification is
carried out before and after compression.
Given two rectangular patches Pi,Pj of size h × w from
the same image, we desire to estimate the logistic prediction
pij that two patches are inconsistent with respect to two
corresponding modification angles αi, αj . The two patches are
consistent if αi = αj = 0 and inconsistent if αi 6= αj = 0.
We propose to verify the inconsistency of Pi and Pj
by means of a Siamese neural network [9]. Siamese neural
networks have been recently exploited for applications in mul-
timedia forensics [10]–[12]. This network architecture consists
of two identical sub-networks fθ, followed by a non-linear
classifier gγ that outputs an inconsistency score zij whose
standard logistic activation is defined as:
pij =
1
1 + e−zij
, and zij = gγ
(
[fθ (Pi)− fθ (Pj)]2pointwise
)
.
The network parameters θ, γ are jointly optimized to minimize
the binary cross-entropy of network logistic predictions pij and
patch inconsistencies yij , written in terms of a loss function
over N training patches:
L = 1
N2 −N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
−yij log(pij)−(1−yij) log(1−pij).
In Figure 2, we provide the sketch of the network architecture.
We use the 50-layer Residual Network (ResNet50) [13] as
the feature extractor fθ, which outputs a 256-dimensional
feature vector. The inconsistency of features extracted from
two patches are evaluated by a pointwise squared difference
operator. The classifier gγ is a multilayer perceptron network
composed by one hidden layer of 16 units and one single-
unit output layer with sigmoid activation outputting pij . We
train two separate Siamese networks end-to-end on large-
scale synthetic training sets. The first model is trained on
400, 000 64×64 patches extracted from uncompressed images
from RAISE [14] and Dresden [15]. To train the second
model, we use the same 400, 000 patches and perform hue
modification before or after JPEG compression with random
quality factors in [55, 100]. Parameters θ are initialized using
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Fig. 2. Proposed Siamese network architecture.
ResNet50 pretrained on ImageNet [16]. On each training
iteration, we optimize the loss function with respect to (θ, γ)
on a mini-batch of 64 pairs, half of which is labeled as
positive, i.e. both two patches are unmodified, and another haft
is labeled as negative, i.e. one patch is modified by an angle
randomly selected in [30, 330] with step 30, and its counterpart
is unmodified. Hue modification and JPEG compression are
carried out during training. We use Adam optimizer with the
starting learning rate 10−4, and schedule to halve it every 5
epochs after the first 30 epochs until convergence.
A. Detection and Localization
1) Heatmap creation: The described architecture outputs
the logistic patches inconsistency. Given a test image, we col-
lect all inconsistency scores and generate a unique localization
heatmap which potentially indicates malicious regions.
Let H,W be height and width of the image, and h,w be
height and width of the small patch. By using a sliding window
with stride s, the total number of patches will be N = NH ×
NW , where NH =
⌊
H−h
s
⌋
+ 1 and NW =
⌊
W−w
s
⌋
+ 1 are
number of patches along each dimension.
Generally, computing inconsistency scores on all possible
pairs is expensive because the number of pairs grows quarat-
ically w.r.t. N . Nevertheless, almost computational burden is
attributed to operations of feature extraction network fθ which
composes convolutional layers. In pairwise manner, one patch
is paired with other N−1 patches and passed through fθ about
N − 1 times. This redundancy can be reduced. We first pre-
extract low-dimensional features of all patches by evaluating
fθ(Pi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and proceed to compute pij for all
possible pairs using all computed features.
For each patch Pk within the image, an inconsistency map
Ik ∈ RNH×NW is built. If we consider all patches according to
their spatial location on the image, Ikij is the inconsistency of
(i, j)-th patch and Pk, where 1 ≤ i ≤ NH and 1 ≤ j ≤ NW .
It is typical to assume that the forged region is relatively
small compared to the background, thus majority of Ik (k
refers to patches on the pristine region) exposes inconsisten-
cies with the forged region, while remaining maps expose
inconsistencies with the pristine region, as shown in Figure
3. In order to fuse inconsistency maps of majority patches
belonging to the pristine region to obtain a unique map
I¯ ∈ RNH×NW , we follow the approach in [12], computing I¯
by mean shift algorithm [17], which iteratively finds mean of
majority (mode). Eventually, I¯ is a subsampled heatmap which
Ground Truth Input Image Patches
Inconsistency
map Final heatmap
Fig. 3. Fusing patch-level inconsistency maps into an image-level map.
potentially highlights malicious region. The full-size heatmap
can be obtained by resizing I¯ with bilinear interpolation. If
the forged region is larger than the background, we obtain the
inverted heatmap since the background is the smaller area.
2) Postprocessing: The standard logistic output pij can be
interpreted as the posterior probability that two patches Pi
and Pj are inconsistent. After mean shifting, each element
p¯ij = I¯ij tells us how probable (i, j)-th patch is forged
because I¯ is the representative inconsistency map of pristine
patches to all patches. While the threshold 0.5 may be a rea-
sonable choice for deciding if two patches are inconsistent, it is
not straightfoward to apply this rule to pixel-level predictions.
Moreover, as keeping False Alarm Rate (FAR) low is critial
in forensic applications, a postprocessing step is important
for pixel-level prediction. With this respect, postprocessing on
each image is cast to finding a statistical threshold τ based
on which a pixel is masked as forged or pristine. We apply
a simple postprocessing based on the assumption that I¯ij (to
avoid adding new notation, we mean I¯ after resized) follows a
Gaussian distribution, I¯ij ∼ N(µ, σ2). We fix τ such that 5%
of the right tail are decided as being forged. τ is lower bounded
by 0.5 to maintain acceptable FAR, namely τ = max (0.5, t).
t is the solution of: 0.95 = 1
σ
√
2pi
∫ t
−∞ e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx. Compared
to the threshold 0.5, τ results in better or equal FAR. An
example of postprocessing is shown in Figure 4.
Final heatmap
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Fig. 4. The heatmap before (left) and after (right) being postprocesed. The
middle plot presents CDF of I¯ij and the threshold τ = 0.61.
III. EXPERIMENTS
Towards experimental evidences, we evaluate our approach
under different configurations and test sets.
A. Test set
To the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly available
dataset on the problem of hue modification. Thus, to evaluate
our method, we generated the test set from 120 raw images of
an external Canon 600D camera (never appeared in training
phase) having CFA pattern GBRG. Raw images are decoded
by dcraw version 9.27. For each image, a top-left region is
cropped out such that H = 768 and W = 1024. The forged
area follows random convex shape fixed within a 256 × 256
bounding box, which is positioned at random location on the
image. Next, we perform hue modification on pixels inside the
polygons and generate multiple test sets:
• Dαpng: Uncompressed images are demosaiced from raw
images by dcraw and subject to local hue modification.
For each modification angle α ∈ [30, 330] step 30, hue
modification is carried out on 120 uncompressed images.
• DQFb−jpg: Hue modification by different angles (10 images
for each modification angle α ∈ [30, 330] step 30) are
carried out on 110 images, and 10 images are unmodified.
Afterwards, all images are compressed using quality
factors QF ∈ [55, 100], step 5.
• DQFa−jpg: 120 images are first compressed using QF ∈
[55, 100], step 5. Afterwards, hue modification by dif-
ferent angles (one angle for 10 images) are carried out
on 110 JPEG images, while the remaining 10 images
are unmodified. All of them are compressed again using
the default quality factor 75. By the second JPEG com-
pression, DQFa−jpg is more challenging since the training
images are only subject to single JPEG compression.
B. Setups
The performance of our method is compared with the
following state of the art methods: Choi et al. [6], based on
CFA-based artifacts and explicitly designed for the estimation
of hue modification, and SpliceBuster [3], based on statistical
features of rich models [2] and selected for comparison since
those features potentially capture local disturbances caused by
local hue modification. We do not compare with [7], [8] given
their strong assumption about the availability of the reference
PRNU which is unrealistic in practical scenarios.
This work particularly focuses on the localization of hue
modification rather than its estimation. Choi et al. [6] is an
estimator which potentially returns the modification angle by
searching over a feasible range. To convert Choi et al. into a
localization method, we use a sliding window 35 similarly
to our method, and search the angle over [0, 359], step 8.
If the angle found is 0 or 352, the patch is marked as
pristine. Choi et al. therefore outputs a binary map. The other
method, SpliceBuster [3], returns the negative log-likelihood
that a pixel is pristine. It means, a large value indicates
high probability that a pixel is forged. We linearly scale the
returned map into [0, 1] and apply the same postprocessing
described in Section II-A2 to get the binary map. In order
to demonstrate the advantage of our postprocessing, we also
report performance of the proposed method when a simple
thresholding is applied to binarize the heatmap. We empirically
found that the threshold 0.8 yields most acceptable results.
We aggregate True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False
Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN) over all images and
report average True Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate
(TNR) and F1 score.
TABLE I
F1 SCORES OF ALL METHODS ON Dαpng .
Angle α→
Method ↓ 30 90 150 210 270 330
Choi et al. 66.16 67.15 65.05 68.34 67.92 68.21
SpliceBuster 18.12 29.57 32.99 26.80 21.97 12.29
Siamese-T-0.8 66.44 65.28 66.22 69.28 70.00 63.23
Siamese-G-0.95 71.79 73.82 73.04 74.41 74.29 69.86
C. Quatitative Evaluation
1) Detection on uncompressed images: In this section, we
evaluate the first model trained on uncompressed images, and
compare with Choi et al. and SpliceBuster on Dαpng . Figure
5 presents TPR and TNR obtained by all methods. Choi et
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Fig. 5. TPR and TNR of all methods on Dαpng .
al. is guaranteed to detect hue modification on uncompressed
images since this type of manipulation distorts demosaicing ar-
tifacts. It achieves high TPR which implies that almost forged
pixels are correctly detected. This comes at a cost of slightly
worse TNR. SpliceBuster, on the other hand, detects correctly
only about 20% of forged pixels, and as a consequence, yields
very high TNR. We assume that the features used in [2] are
ineffective for hue modification detection.
Our Siamese network with heatmaps thresholded simply by
0.8 is denoted by Siamese-T-0.8. The other alternative is de-
noted by Siamese-G-0.95, where heatmaps are postprocessed
by threshold τ as designed in Section II-A2. We can clearly see
that Siamese-G-0.95 outperforms Siamese-T-0.8 in all cases.
In fact, a fixed threshold over all heatmaps cannot deal with
high variability of predictive scores on each heatmap, and thus
an adaptive threshold is more effective. Interestingly, the TPR
reveals the fact that the middle range of modification angles are
easier to detect by our methodologies. This is explainable since
the strength of hue modification is periodic with the period of
360◦. Very small or very large positive angles correspond to
little modifications.
We summarize the overall performance for some selective
modification angles in Table I. In terms of F1 score, Siamese-
G-0.95 outperforms all other methods.
2) Detection in the presence of JPEG compression: We
target more practical scenarios where hue modification is
done with the presence of JPEG compression. It has been
acknowledged that JPEG compression has strong impact on
demosaicing artifacts [18]–[20]. Choi et al. is also very
sensitive to JPEG compression since the count of interpolated
and recorded pixels is less accurate [6].
TABLE II
F1 SCORES OF ALL METHODS ON DQFb−jpg .
QF →
Method ↓ 75 80 85 90 95 100
Choi et al. 9.80 9.74 9.69 9.85 10.05 39.47
SpliceBuster 12.80 12.47 14.26 14.66 15.57 21.44
Siamese-T-0.8 51.96 53.43 54.77 54.56 56.81 61.60
Siamese-G-0.95 61.41 60.83 63.03 64.65 66.73 69.11
We assess the second model trained on JPEG images under
two testing circumstances: i) hue modification is performed on
uncompressed images followed by JPEG compression, and ii)
hue modification is performed on JPEG compressed images,
and those are subsequently compressed again using quality
factor 75. Note that during training, we do not perform second
JPEG compression.
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Fig. 6. TPR and TNR of all methods on DQFb−jpg and DQFa−jpg . QF is the
first compression quality factor.
The TPR and TNR of all methods, where hue modification
is performed before JPEG compression, i.e. dataset DQFb−jpg,
is shown in the first column of Figure 6. Choi et al. fails to
spot forged area unless the image is compressed with highest
QF . At QF = 100, Choi et al. achieves TPR 82.88% and
TNR 88.15%. SpliceBuster, on the other hand, can only detect
about 10% of forged pixels. Our proposed methods perform far
better than the other two competitors on DQFb−jpg , by keeping
TPR at acceptable level and retaining always high TNR, i.e.,
Siamese-G-0.95 achieves an average 64.67% of TPR (≈ 65%
of forged pixels are correctly detected) and 97.72% of TNR,
while Siamese-T-0.8 attains 54.35% of TPR and 97.39% of
TNR. In the right column of Figure 6, i.e. dataset DQFa−jpg , the
overall TPR and TNR of our methods are slightly degraded
compared to the performance on DQFb−jpg . This degradation can
be attributed to the second JPEG compression. In fact, we can
generally observe the correlation of performance degradation
and compression rate: the higher the first QF , the lower the
performance. While Choi et al. behaves positively on D100b−jpg ,
it loses that capability on D100a−jpg .
The overall F1 scores for several selective QF are shown in
Table II and III. Our two methodologies, in particular Siamese-
TABLE III
F1 SCORES OF ALL METHODS ON DQFa−jpg .
QF →
Method ↓ 75 80 85 90 95 100
Choi et al. 9.68 9.62 9.55 9.70 9.65 9.65
SpliceBuster 5.07 4.63 3.08 6.35 4.74 4.82
Siamese-T-0.8 52.85 46.76 41.29 49.93 46.13 46.09
Siamese-G-0.95 63.51 57.52 49.83 58.36 56.32 55.75
G-0.95, outperform the other two methods to a large margin.
We might notice that Choi et al. achieves F1 score 39.47%
on D100b−jpg while TPR and TNR in the same configuration
are over 80%, see left column in Figure 6. This phenomenon
is due to the high FP which penalizes precision, and as a
consequence, F1 score. However, since TN dominates FP (due
to the large pristine area compared to the forged area), TNR
is not effectively penalized.
D. Qualitative Inspection
In Figure 7, we provide detection results on realistic ex-
amples manually created using GIMP. Hue modification is
carried out on uncompressed images (the first 5 lines) and the
modified images are JPEG compressed using highest quality
QF = 100 (the last 5 lines). Siamese-G-0.95 (the last column)
clearly results in better detection maps compared with Choi et
al. and SpliceBuster.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a data-driven countermeasure for hue
modification on color images based on patch matching. This
task is done by means of a Siamese architecture which
receives the two inputs and outputs the likelihood that the two
inputs are inconsistent. A unique localization map is generated
from inconsistency scores of multiple patches. Our models
perform well on uncompressed and JPEG compressed images
even though JPEG compression distorts CFA and demosaicing
artifacts. Our future investigations will focus on the estimation
of hue modification angles, based on which the original image
can be recovered.
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